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A model of international banking, with a stress on manager human-capital (borrower monitor-
ing) and majority-shareholder human capital (manager auditing) is constructed to study the im-
pact of exogenous shocks in one country on credit creation in another. I show that the presence 
of the two cited categories of non-transferable skills in banking technology reduces the role of 
the standard portfolio-diversification motive in the cross-border transmission of disturbances. At 
the same time, this bank-specific market friction creates a separate channel of shock propaga-
tion, a function of bank shareholder and manager incentives. It can even happen that the impact of 
an exogenous shock on credit has a different sign in the “relationship” as opposed to the “arm’s- 
-length” banking environment. This phenomenon, caused by the marginal effect of the human- 
-capital management in the bank operation, is present in those bank branches with relatively 
small loan volumes. When the loan volume is large, the direction of the reaction of the manager- 
-auditing bank to shocks abroad is the same as that of an arm’s-length lender.  
 
Keywords: multinational bank, managerial effort, audit, credit, foreign shock 
 
JEL Classification: F37, G21, G28, G31 
 
1. Introduction 
Are the consequences of a shock in one country on the development of another different 
in economies with a high degree of foreign-bank penetration when international banks provide 
an  additional  transmission  medium  beyond  the  standard  financial  markets?  Should  this  be 
an area of concern for bank regulators, suggesting an approach with particularly beneficial ef-
fects in turbulent times? Both questions, beside the associated theoretical challenge, are of great 
practical importance for economies that are financially integrated with larger, external ones. 
Standard portfolio-optimization theory derives wealth allocation across assets and  their 
pricing  from  statistics  of  exogenous  random  factors. If a structural-uncertainty parameter of 
an economy changes, investor portfolios are shifted to reflect the new equilibrium prices of risk. 
Thus, if an international investor decides between assets in two different countries, an adverse 
shock to the asset-return pattern in one country usually calls for wealth reallocation toward 
the other. Naturally, the theoretical foundation of this result erodes quickly as one departs from 
the frictionless-market paradigm. More often than not, cross-subsidizing within a multinational 
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bank is the only visible reaction to the mentioned asymmetric development of national asset 
returns. Formalization of the rational reasons behind the observed responses to shocks can be 
addressed with a toolkit provided by financial intermediation microeconomics. Such is the ge-
neral objective of this paper. 
1.1 Background 
The  banking sectors of the new EU member states from central and eastern Europe 
(CEE) are all characterized by a high degree of foreign penetration. The cases range from 
the near-100  percent  dominance  of  foreign-owned  banks  in  the  domestic  sector  (Czech 
Republic,  Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary) to a substantial presence (Latvia, Poland). 
This is untypical for the rest of the European Union (EU). Even small open economies outside 
the  CEE  region  do  not  usually  show  excessive  foreign-bank  presence  targeted  at  servicing 
the local economy as such. That is, most of them either have a tradition of international banking 
activities  of  their  own  (the  Benelux  countries  or  Greece) or of providing offshore financial 
services (Cyprus and Malta). We are left with two exceptions, Denmark and Portugal, which 
host a significant share of banking-service providers from abroad with the conventional objec-
tive of credit provision to the domestic market. Both are small open economies without inter-
national financial center or tax-haven ambitions. Their foreign-bank penetration is mainly due to 
bigger neighboring economies: Scandinavian in the case of Denmark, Spanish in the case of 
Portugal. The exact reasons (historical, cultural, and geographical, in addition to purely com-
mercial) for the cross-border expansion of bank activities are immaterial for the present study. 
Our main point here is that for small open economies neighboring a bigger economic area, 
foreign-bank operations can constitute a significant source of exogenous uncertainty on the do-
mestic market. This reality has less to do with the immediate transitional-economy history than 
with economic size and relative surroundings factor. 
Figure 1 compares seven relevant new EU member states from the CEE region (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia), Denmark, and Portugal in 
terms of the weight of foreign banks in their respective economies.
1 We use four indicators – 
total banking-sector assets, total assets of foreign-bank branches, total bank loans, and loans 
granted by foreign-bank subsidiaries – all relative to nominal gross domestic product (GDP). To 
get an idea of the extent of foreign-bank penetration, one can compare the said indicators in 
pairs for each country. All data are for year-end 2003. When defining the banking sectors, we 
have excluded central banks and special-purpose institutions such as mortgage banks, building 
societies, and foreign trade-credit agencies. When selecting banks under foreign control, we 
choose only those in which the parent company (the majority shareholder or the ultimate owner) 
is itself a bank. All data are from BankScope. 
Although  BankScope  does  not  provide  distinct  information  on  foreign  branches, 
the conclusions one can draw from the data for subsidiaries cannot be but reinforced since their 
qualitative role is hardly different.
2 For the purposes of quantitative assessment, it may be useful 
to  keep  in  mind  the  relative  weights  of  foreign-bank  branches.  For  instance,  foreign-bank 
branches active in the Czech Republic in the first two quarters of 2004 accounted for more than 
9 percent of the commercial banking sector’s total assets and 11 percent of the loans. One would 
expect similar figures for Slovakia, somewhat higher for Hungary, and lower for Poland and 
the Baltic states. Exact measurement is not important to what we do in this paper. 
The well-known discrepancy of financial depth between old and new EU members is 
indeed reflected in Figure 1. Therefore, the same absolute level of foreign-bank penetration 
(e.g., the foreign-subsidiary loan-size/GDP ratio, approximately equal to 0.22 both for Denmark 
and Slovakia) can correspond to anything from the substantial, although still minority, market 
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positions of foreign banks to nearly 100 percent foreign dominance. Accordingly, given the dif-
ference of the degree of financial depth in the old and the new European Union, our indicators 
confirm the high degree of foreign-bank penetration in the selected countries. It is important to 
note  that  foreign-bank  total  assets and loan figures relative to GDP are surprisingly similar 
across the sample (with the exception of Estonia, a very small economy providing an example of 
nearly perfect regionalization, not just integration, in terms of banking services). An immediate 
interpretation is that the role of bank credit in new member state economies is modest compared 
to old EU economies. However, the most advanced parts of such new EU economies, namely, 
the ones whose ownership, financing, and production structures are integrated with other indus-
trialized countries, make use of bank credit to the same extent as their counterparts. 
 
FIGURE 1 Bank-sector Depth and Foreign-bank Penetration in Small EU Economies (year-end 2003) 
Data: BankScope 
 
In view of the above, it is reasonable to consider the impulses, both positive and nega-
tive, coming to CEE economies through foreign-bank presence as a highly significant factor, 
one that influences their economic well being. We take this as a sufficient justification for a de-
tailed theoretical analysis of foreign-bank activities inside any small open economy. 
In the new member states, foreign bank penetration took place before EU accession, that 
is, before the EU-unified bank-licensing system. Penetration took the form of both local bank 
acquisition and the establishment of branches. The distinction between the two forms of foreign 
presence is not critical to our analysis, mainly given the relatively big size of the parent banks 
compared with their foreign units. Given this circumstance, two particular observations come as 
no surprise: capital constraints are slack for CEE banks under foreign control, so that own ca-
pital or lack thereof has little impact on activities in the host countries; and the financial control 
of parent company’s over foreign-unit operations is usually quite tight, regardless of the repre-
sentation form.
3 
Due to the almost complete foreign-bank dominance over the banking sectors of the new 
EU member states, the pace and form of the financial integration of the latter has become an endo-
genous process. Given the slow growth of CEE capital markets, multinational banks are respon-
sible for the most significant component of the region’s financial-integration process as a whole. 
The forces behind their lending and deposit-taking behavior thus become a major macroeco-
nomic concern. Specifically, governance issues within multinational banks put to the fore-
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ground the question of managerial performance and accountability in individual country units. 
We intend to demonstrate that managerial human capital and incentives are factors to be taken 
very seriously when assessing the possible channels of cross-border shock via a multinational 
bank. 
Our  arguments  are  applicable  to  both  standard  organizational  forms  of  foreign-bank 
presence, branches and subsidiaries. Nevertheless, for our purposes it is easier to think of the fo-
reign-bank operation in a small economy along the branch form, that is, without separate capital 
requirements and with a centralized alternative to localized management. We try to react to 
the two cited stylized facts visible in foreign-owned bank activities in CEE economies: over-
capitalization (i.e., slack regulatory capital constraints) and the gradually increasing weight of 
branch-based presence. Both observations indicate that the legal structure may not be the prime 
factor of relevance and that the role of banking supervision has to be understood less conven-
tionally in such economies. Accordingly, our analysis can be considered as complementary to 
those  papers  directly  addressing  the  organizational-form  aspects  of  bank  risks  (Calzolari, 
Lóránth, 2004), (Dermine, 2003), (Lóránth, Morrison, 2003). 
1.2 Highlights of the Analysis 
The multinational bank that we model faces fundamental market imperfections caused 
by the fact that it is a bank and not a textbook international investor. What makes it different is 
the presence of the twin principle-agent phenomena (bank shareholders vs. managers, managers 
vs. borrowers) that are at the core of the banking business according to the theory developed by 
Diamond (1984) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001). 
We construct an environment in which banks exist for the reason exemplified in Dia-
mond  and  Rajan  (2000,  2001).  Namely,  banks  grant  loans  because  their  managers  possess 
specific, non-transferable human capital that allows them to collect debt better than an outside 
creditor. The extent to which this managerial human capital is being employed corresponds to 
the degree to which relationship-banking features prevail in the economy. At the same time, 
a bank is able to attract deposits – and therewith extend the scale of its operation outside the li-
mits of own available funds – only because the rents from improved debt collection are not 
entirely appropriated by the managers themselves. Part is being turned over to the shareholders 
and depositors, since the former have the ability to audit the manager-run bank, reducing the ma-
nager’s exclusive control over the proceeds from the loan portfolio. At the same time, the depo-
sitors’ position allows them to threaten the shareholders and managers with a run on the bank if 
an audit is not carried out and the human capital not supplied, as such would imply that the re-
sulting revenues are insufficient to repay depositors’ claims. Thus, the underlying mechanism of 
the  bank  function  in  our  model,  as  per  Diamond-Rajan,  involves  the  two  principal-agent 
relationships. One is between the bank manager and the borrower, in which the manager is 
the principal; the other is between the shareholder and the manager, in which the manager is 
the agent. We formulate a “reduced-form” model of an international bank along these lines, 
meaning that the game-theoretic elements of manager-shareholder and manager-borrower inter-
actions are present backstage. A common multinational shareholder employs two managers of 
national branches, each doing the loan-deposit business within the respective national borders. 
The shareholder audits the managers (at a cost) and the managers exercise their borrower-moni-
toring effort (also at a cost). Under these conditions, deposits are collected and credit granted in 
non-zero amounts. Then we ask what happens to the provision of credit by the bank branch in 
one country if an exogenous disturbance to real economic activity occurs in the other. Speci-
fically, we are interested in the difference of behavior compared with a multinational investor 
who is not a bank in the Diamond-Rajan sense but an international portfolio optimizer handling 
all assets at arm’s length. 
The  analysis  confirms  the  existence  of  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  differences 
between  responses to shocks abroad by the bank dependent on manager human capital and 
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1.  Relationship-based  (i.e.,  dependent  on  manager  human  capital)  and  arm’s-length  multi-
national banks differ in their reactions to parent-bank home-country disturbances, the dif-
ference in a foreign-unit behavior being related to the volume of its lending in the host 
country. 
2.  Spillovers of the home-country shocks to the host-country credit are most likely to happen 
through relatively small branches, whereas in big branches spillovers are efficiently blocked 
by local-manager incentives . 
3.  If  the  branch  credit  volume  is  big  enough, then an exogenous reduction of the branch-
manager audit costs by the bank shareholders leads to credit expansion. 
 
Put differently, the most problematic in terms of shock spillovers are branches that ma-
nage small volumes of loans. That is, under these conditions, the marginal effect of the manager 
effort is particularly strong and the usual international portfolio-diversification motive is domi-
nated by this specific manager input motive. Therefore, the loan volume granted by the branch is 
expanded in situations where a standard investor would contract it, and vice versa. On the con-
trary, relatively big lenders, even if the role of manager input therein is prominent, react simi-
larly to the arm’s-length investor, quantitative differences notwithstanding. The same is true for 
the shocks originating in a different country, that is, happening to a variable that does not enter 
the surplus definition for the manager in the country branch. To our knowledge, there are no 
other contributions to the literature on financial intermediation combining the Diamond-Rajan 
theory of banking with an analysis of cross-border shock propagation in the above sense. 
1.3 Literature Review 
The current economic thinking about the relations among bank organizational structure, 
management incentives, and credit policies is strongly influenced by the work of Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1993). These authors created a model that accommodated the roles of shareholder, 
depositor, and regulator. The principal conclusion is that regulation exists because small, dis-
persed claim holders on a bank (i.e., the depositors) are unable to coordinate their effort well 
enough to enforce adequate management decisions. However, the approach of Dewatripont and 
Tirole is not bank specific (i.e., it can be equally applied to any profit-seeking enterprise with 
decisions delegated to managers). The literature directly addressing the special role of banks 
exploits the information asymmetry between entrepreneur and  investor. Thus, Diamond (1984) 
explains the existence of banks via their role as delegated monitors of risky investment. This 
idea was further developed to explain the necessity of financial intermediaries in the form of 
banks in an environment where not just entrepreneurial effort but also the effort given to its 
monitoring is partially unobservable (see (Diamond, Rajan, 2000)). Beside that, the systemic 
specificity of banks and other credit institutions from the macroeconomic point of view requires 
a structured analysis of bank financing and investment decisions. A widely recognized unified 
approach to capital budgeting by financial institutions was offered by Froot and Stein (1998).  
The existing theory of bank risk management mostly relies on highly stylized models, 
usually in two or three periods, that investigate the role of different asymmetric-information ef-
fects on organizational form and asset-portfolio composition. The underlying property of the mo-
deled entity is its tendency to generate a phenomenon called “capture” (see, e.g., (Dell’Ariccia, 
Marquez, 2004)). This is an advanced form of information asymmetry in the capital market. 
Under “borrower capture” one understands the inability of finance-seeking entrepreneur to com-
municate the project-quality information credibly to anyone but the “house bank.” Similarly, 
“intermediary capture” occurs if a bank seeking to attract depositors and outside equity pro-
viders is unable to credibly communicate the quality of its investment portfolio to anyone but 
the incumbent majority shareholder. Sometimes, the existence of capture in theoretical models 
leads  to  surprising  results  when  the  interplay  with  regulatory  policies  is  considered.  (For 
instance,  bank-share  ownership  can  become  more  risky  as  a  result  of  capital  requirements 
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the regulator’s own reputation and its significance for the equilibrium resource allocation in 
the financial-services market – to the discussion.) An important object of study is the probability 
of a depositor run or bank failure (more generally, the occurrences of financial crises) in a dyna-
mic perspective. These models are concerned with the long-term sustainability of loan and depo-
sit markets rather than the outcome of a single strategic encounter between financial-service 
providers and suppliers. In this vein, Repullo (2004) studies the existence of “prudent” versus 
“gambling” equilibria as a function of regulatory requirements and the impact on the credit 
conditions. Another recent contribution to this line of literature is (Monnet, Quintin, 2004), in 
which not just the current state but also the historical path of financial markets determines their 
size and structure in the next period. 
The  extension  of  the  discussed  framework  to  multinational  banks,  as  in  Külpmann 
(2000), involves deepening the analysis to the level of individual divisions (branches) and their 
managers’  optimal  choices  within  a  multinational  bank.  Alternatively,  Chan-Lau  and  Chen 
(2002) derive a dependence of the financial crisis (a reversal in the credit supply) in an open 
economy on the extent of frictions in the financial sector relative to the economic fundamentals. 
These and related papers subsume that international asset diversification is an important motive 
in multinational-bank decision making, which is long recognized in the literature on interna-
tional finance (see, e.g., (Heston, Rouwenhorst, 1994)). 
The  specific  topic  of  foreign-bank  presence  in  the  CEE region was covered by two 
empirical reports by de Haas and van Lelyveld (2002, 2003), which use Bank for International 
Settlements’ and BankScope statistics ending in 2000. Developing on earlier empirical literature 
mainly concerned with Latin America, these reports distinguish between the “pull factor” and 
the “push factor” associated with foreign-bank penetration. The former corresponds to the re-
duction in credit by foreign banks in reaction to economic downturns and financial crises in 
the host country (and its expansion during booms), the latter deals with reaction to the home- 
-country situation of the parent bank. There is a positive push effect when home-country dis-
turbances  result  in  a  credit  contraction  by  foreign units (the parent bank is concerned with 
balance-sheet repair). A negative push factor is present when home difficulties lead foreign units 
to lend more (the parent bank follows the standard portfolio-diversification logic). For the CEE, 
de Haas and van Lelyveld find that the pull factor is absent: foreign banks did not cut credit 
during host-country troubles. On the other hand, they do find a negative push effect: there is 
a significant  negative  relationship  between  home-country economic growth and host-country 
credit by foreign banks. This finding is supported by informal evidence from other sources. 
Given  that  the  workings  of  the  push  factor  have  implications  for  both  macroeconomic  and 
financial stability, the model to be developed here will be primarily used to study the spillover 
of home-country shocks through dependent bank units in the host country. 
Recently, international bank-regulation issues also received attention. Holthausen and 
Rønde (2004) study the impact of the home- and the host-country supervisor information ex-
change  on  bank-closure  decisions.  Lóránth  and  Morrison  (2003)  examine  the  role  of  national 
deposit insurance and evaluate its impact on the decision making of multinational banks. They also 
link  the  result  about  cross-border  investment  choices  to  the  existence  of  a  multinational  bank 
channel for financial contagion. Calzolari and Lóránth (2004) extend the analysis to include a wel-
fare-optimizing regulator and show how the regulatory stance is influenced by the chosen repre-
sentative form (branch vs. subsidiary) of the foreign bank. Morrison and White (2004) endow 
the  regulator  with  an additional ability (beside bank-licensing and capital-adequacy require-
ments), asset auditing, and examine the impact of this additional tool on the phenomena of 
adverse selection and moral hazard in the banking sector. Their model allows for multiple equi-
libria, some of which entail confidence crisis in the banking sector and a corresponding welfare- 
-reducing decrease in project financing. 
Although we do not model the regulator explicitly, the problems discussed in this last 
strain of literature have a direct bearing on this paper. By focusing on risk grouping in accor-
dance  with  the  country  of  origin,  we  are  able  to  concentrate  the  analysis  on  international AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  93
financial intermediaries co-existing with national regulators. In our approach, the capture effect 
is studied as friction between entrepreneurs, banks, and investors of individual countries (in fact, 
we are thereby also able to address the question of home bias in the bank-loan markets with 
the twin capture effects). Given the focus of this paper on the credit-creation aspects of the bank-
ing industry, explicit coverage of bank failure and closure alternatives is not essential. Hence, 
there are no bankruptcies in our model. Otherwise, after a formal description of bank asset and 
liability transformation under bankruptcy, one would have to conduct the very same analysis of 
deposit collection and lending under new owners and managers. Therefore, we model banks and 
bank managers, whose preferences exclude a termination of activity for reason of a depositor 
run or a regulatory action (both are only present as latent threats). Regulation, in our under-
standing,  is  a  set  of  legal  norms  that  co-determine  a  bank’s  shareholder  and  managers’ 
preference structures. Supervision, on the other hand, is understood as a way for policymakers to 
influence the parameters of banks’ day-to-day operations, such as the opportunity cost of capital 
or sensitivity to liquidity fluctuations. One of the consequences of our model is a case for a re-
gulatory policy that facilitates the bank portfolio audit for its shareholders and depositors. In this 
way, the domestic banking regulator may support an equilibrium with a high degree of specific 
manager human capital in multinational bank branches under his jurisdiction. Suppose there is 
a sudden reversal in the credit-creation process owing to a real or financial disturbance in the 
 home country of the parent bank or banks. If, as is the case in the small open economies dis-
cussed earlier, too many host-country borrowers depend on loans from foreign-controlled bank, 
this reversal will have a macro-impact, with possible subsequent implications for the financial 
health of the real sector, that is, financial stability. The domestic regulator is not in the position 
to change the behavior of the incumbent foreign-controlled bank. However, a proper regulatory 
stance can encourage the entry of other banks able to provide the missing funds. In this respect, 
we suggest that one key criterion of the regulatory and supervisory policies is their ability to 
reduce bank managers’ monitoring costs. This will reduce agency problems, particularly in fo-
reign-bank branches that manage large loan volumes, that is, those with the highest degree of 
systemic significance. As a result, these branches will no longer act as transmitters of distur-
bances from the parent-bank countries to the domestic credit market. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 
presents the main results concerning the reaction of foreign branches to international shocks. Sec-
tion 4 indicates possible extension of the analysis to the problems of regulatory policies and exchan-
ge rate risks. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of the technical statements are collected in the Appendix. 
2. The Model 
There are two countries in our model, each offering one general investment opportunity 
and another opportunity to grant non-traded loans. There is also a risk-free money-market de-
posit opportunity. An international financial institution is owned by a representative shareholder. 
She operates branches in both countries and can, in addition to investing her own funds in either 
of these assets, collect deposits from the public. Each branch faces a supply of deposits within 
the country, which is an upward-sloping function of the deposit rate that it offers. Some deposits 
may be withdrawn upon the payment of interest due to an unspecified liquidity shock. 
To perform the loan and deposit business, the shareholder usually hires a manager for 
the bank branch. The branch manager possesses an endowment of non-transferable human capi-
tal, allowing him to collect a rate of return on the loans in excess of the baseline arm’s-length 
rate that can be extracted from the same borrowers by an outside investor in the market. He is 
remunerated by a fee paid out of the branch’s proceeds. 
There are two dates, the first when the capital allocation, deposit collection, and lending 
takes place, and the second when returns are realized and interest and fees paid. The shareholder 
and the managers are risk-averse expected-utility maximizers. The uncertainties at date 0 exist 
with regard to six variables (three in each country): return on loans, return on outside assets, and 
deposit/withdrawal rate. AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  94
2.1 Bank Balance Sheet and Cash Flows 
The general notational convention to be employed throughout the paper is the use of 
uppercased  letters for the home-country variables and lowercased letters for foreign-country 
ones. 
Let C, D, X
0, and X be, respectively, shareholder own funds (capital), deposits, cash 
holdings, and granted loans, for the home-country branch. There are opportunity costs of capital 
equal to the rate of return, R
C, on domestic outside assets. The interest rate on deposits is R
D, and 
the random deposit/withdrawal rate at date 1 is Ξ. Cash earns the risk-free money-market rate of 
return, R
0, whereas the loans earn  a risky rate of return R. This means that the date-1 domestic 
wealth of the bank shareholder is equal to: 
0 0
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
D C
W X R X R D R C R = + + + − + Ξ − +  
       







0 be the excess returns on loans, deposits, and outside 
assets  over  the  risk-free  rate.
4  Given  the  bank  branch  balance-sheet  identity  C+D = X
0+X, 
the expression for domestic wealth can be rewritten as: 
D C W XY DY CY = + −                                                   (1) 
Analogously, the cash wealth of the foreign branch at date 1 is: 
d c
w xy dy cy = + −                                                         (2) 
To keep the model complexity under control, we do not model exchange-rate risks separately, 
but offer a few comments concerning their role in Section 4. For the moment, the shareholder 
gross cash wealth at date 1 coming from both bank branches is simply W
S = W + w. From this, 
one shall subtract the manager fees and the costs of the manager audit. The formation mecha-
nism of both is described next. 
2.2 Shareholder-Manager Interaction 
For definiteness, we describe the manager fees and audit costs for the home-country 
branch; the foreign-branch results are obtainable by a simple change in notation. 
If the loan portfolio represented by X were held by an outside investor without any 
particular knowledge of, or relationship with, the involved borrowers, the date 1-excess return 
on it would be a constant mean V plus a zero-mean normal noise. The branch manager can do 
better than that, provided he puts to work his human capital by exercising the amount of effort 
H>0. Then, the return becomes: 
( )
X
Y F H ε = +  
where  the  disturbance  ε
X  is  normal,  with  zero  mean  and  standard  deviation  σX.  Here,  F  is 
a strictly increasing and strictly concave function, with F(0) = V and the limit at infinity equal to 
V
H>V.
5 The managerial effort is costly, the cost function,  ( ) H H Φ ￿ , being strictly increasing 
and convex, with Φ(0) = 0. Thus, the attainable mean return on the loan portfolio varies with 
the manager’s effort between V and V
H, the maximum value being possible only at infinite cost. 
                                                            
4 If all deposits were claimed back at date 1, we would have Ξ=1 and Y
D=R
0–R
D. However, we should 
think of a typical case when only a fraction of deposits is withdrawn and, accordingly, Ξ is a random 
variable distributed around a mean value substantially below unity. 
5 One can think of the “true” potential return on X as an unobservable value. By employing his human 
capital, the branch manager obtains a noisy signal about the potential return. The signal is downward 
biased, but the bias decreases with H. Note the difference of this interpretation and the one-in-many 
microfinance models, where the signals are unbiased and only their precision varies. Our understanding 
is closer to the discrete version of Girsanov’s probability: better signals mean a more precise knowledge 
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If the shareholder’s control over the branch were at the outside-investor level, she would 
consider Y a random variable with the low mean V: Y = V+ε
X+ε
S. The additional (compared with 
the manager) noise ε
S is assumed zero-mean normal with variance σS, independent of ε
X and all 
other sources of uncertainty. The shareholder can spend the amount of pecuniary and non-pecu-
niary resources B in order to audit the manager’s activities in the branch. One effect of the audit 
is the shareholder’s ability to reduce her bias in the knowledge of Y, similarly to the manager. 
The other effect is her enhanced ability to collect on risky loans in the event she dismisses 
the manager and runs the branch directly. The enhanced collection ability is a function of the audit 
resources  per  unit  of  loan,  A = B/X.  If  the  manager  is  fired,  the  shareholder,  by  her  direct 




ε ε = + +    
 
 
with G being a strictly increasing and strictly concave function, with G(0) = V and the limit at 
infinity equal to V
S∈(V,V
H). The shareholder revenue must be subsequently reduced by the audit 
cost, which is assumed to be a strictly increasing convex function K of B, with K(0) = 0. Of course, 
the balance-sheet decisions  X ￿ and  D ￿ , taken by the shareholder acting alone, as well as domestic- 
-branch cash wealth so attained,  W ￿ , would be different from the ones following from the mana-
ger’s decisions (plain symbols with no tildas; the difference will be characterized shortly). We shall 
call the hypothetical values  X ￿ and  D ￿  (and the two corresponding values for the foreign-country 
branch) the shareholder’s substitute portfolio choices. Note that the manager has no authority over 
the shareholder’s own funds allocated to the branch. Therefore, we can think about the C variable 
as being set by the shareholder in advance of the manager-shareholder negotiations over recom-
pense and thus not entering the bargaining process. The shareholder decides rationally upon 
the C-value in anticipation of the negotiation outcome (see also Section 2.3). 
The shareholder’s inability to fully replace the manager is expressed, first, by the inequality 
V
S<V
H, and, second, by the presence of additional noise, ε
S, in the return. Nevertheless, the pos-
sibility to audit allows the shareholder to threaten the manager with dismissal should he decide to 
claim the whole rent on the debt-collection ability for himself, cutting out the bank owner. With the 
audit, a part of the rent is turned over to the shareholder and another part to the depositors. The latter 
effect arises since the depositors are offered a rate of interest sufficient to attract them to the bank. 
We assume that in the course of mutual negotiations, the shareholder makes known to 
the manager the resources, B, to be allocated to audit. The manager then selects his fee, M, so 
that the shareholder is indifferent to keeping or dismissing the manager: 
( ) ( ) W K B M W K B − − = − ￿  
which is equivalent to requiring the fee, which is lower by one cent lower than 
M W W = − ￿                                                             (3) 
Any fee higher than the left-hand side of equation (3) would see the manager dismissed, since 
the shareholder would do better acting in his place herself. A lower fee would be suboptimal for 
the manager unless he was exposed to competition from others with human capital linked to 
the same loan portfolio, which is highly improbable. Namely, we associate the manager’s spe-
cial skills with his knowledge about the repayment ability of the set of borrowers that comprise 
the loan portfolio of the branch. In other words, managers have an enhanced ability to collect on 
debt because they act in a relationship-banking environment. Altogether, equation (3) is just one 
of the many existing ways to describe the shareholder-manager negotiation outcome, which was 
chosen for its computational tractability.
6 
                                                            
6 For instance, in (Diamond, Rajan, 2000) the bargaining power is split at random between the share-
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The agreed managerial fees are inputs into the optimization programs solved by the two 
managers and the shareholder. 
2.3 Optimal Investment, Audit, and Managerial Effort 
We  shall  consider  the  case  when  the  shareholder  maximizes  the  expected  negative 
exponential utility with risk-aversion parameter γ of the date-1 cash wealth, W
S=W+w, net of 
manager fees and audit costs: 
( ) { } [ ] exp ( ) ( ) E W w M m K B k b γ − − + − − − −  
Each manager maximizes his own expected negative exponential utility of the fee, net of the ef-
fort costs, that is,  
( ) { } [ ] exp ( )
M E W W H γ Φ − − − − ￿  
and 
( ) { } [ ] exp ( )
m E w w h γ φ − − − − ￿  
or the home- and the foreign-branch manager, respectively. The three risk-aversion parameters 
γ, γ
M, and γ
m need not be equal to one another. 
The risk-aversion assumption for all agents in the model is used to generate non-trivial 
demands for different assets and allows one to analyze portfolio shifts in response to shocks. For 
the same reason, the asset returns contain random noises even though the latter are unaffected by 
the relationship-banking degree, that is, they are seemingly unrelated to the central object of our 
interest. As mentioned before, our concept of informational frictions in the loan market utilizes 
the effect of biased information (errors in the perceived mean values) rather than imprecise 
information (higher than efficient variances). All the same, non-zero variances are needed in 
the present setting to prevent the problem from becoming vacuous. 
Negative exponential utility has been selected for the sake of explicitness and ease of 
computation, although qualitatively similar results – albeit with a messier algebra – are obtain-
able for more general forms of the utility function. 
2.3.1 Manager’s Choices 
For definiteness, we formulate below the result for the foreign-branch manager, the do-
mestic-manager results being recoverable by change of notation. 




r r π ￿  be the public supply of deposits as a strictly increasing function of the deposit 
rate, and  ( ) d t d ￿  its inverse. Formally, optimizing with respect to r
d and d by the manager is 
equivalent. The manager and the shareholder will be assumed to optimize the deposit volume as 
monopolists,  taking  the  inverse  deposit-supply  function  t  into  account. The choice-theoretic 
background of the bank-depositor interaction is not central to the subject of this paper and is left 
outside its scope.  
Recall that the manager takes the capital allocated to the branch, c, as well as the “tilda 
variables” (the values of  d ￿  and  x ￿  that would be set by the shareholder if she decided to act 






d σ , and analogously for the excess 
return on the outside investment (or the shareholder’s effective opportunity cost of capital in 
the foreign country), y
c. The correlation coefficient between ε
x and ε
d will be denoted ρdx. Then, 
the manager’s optimal choices of x, d, and h can be characterized as follows: 
                                                                                                                                            
offer to the other. In this paper, we renounce the possibility to explore the available game-theoretic 
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( ) ( )
2 ( )
x d x dx m
f h
x x d d σ σ σ ρ
γ
− + − = ￿ ￿                                            (4a) 
( ) ( )
2 ( ) ( )
d
d x dx d m
n d d t d
x x d d σ σ ρ σ
γ
′ − −
− + − =
￿
￿ ￿                            (4b) 
( ) ( ) xf h h φ ′ ′ =                                                          (4c) 
This fact is an immediate consequence of the standard negative exponential utility maximization 
results. 
Two  observations  can  be  made  immediately  by  inspecting  the  first-order  condition 
(FOC) of optimality (equations 4a–4c). 
First,  looking  at  equation  (4c),  which  is  valid  for  effort  levels  h≥0,  one  can  infer 
the minimal  level  of  loans  justifying  the  manager human-capital involvement in the branch, 
namely,  (0) / (0) x f φ ′ ′ = . That is, the relationship banking will be entertained by the foreign 
branch only for  x x >  (a similar threshold value exists for the domestic branch as well). 
Second, equations (4a) and (4b) demonstrate that the branch balance sheet, characterized 
by the triplet (c, d, x) or (c,  d ￿ , x ￿ ), looks different with and without manager participation, even 
if  the  shareholder’s  benefit  is  the  same  in  both  cases.  Specifically,  the  difference  between 
the levels of granted credit is: 
( )
( ) 2 2
1





x x f h n d d t d
σ ρ
γ σ ρ σ





￿ ￿                       (5) 
 
One should think of the right-hand side of equation (5) as a typically positive value that shows 
by how much the manager must increase the size of the branch loan portfolio, compared with 
the hypothetical shareholder-management situation, in order to earn a positive fee. 
2.3.2 Shareholder’s Choices 
Because  the  shareholder  knows  the  rules  as  per  equation  (3),  according  to  which 
the manager fees in both branches is set, she is faced with the objective of selecting the variables 
C, 
D R ￿ ,  X ￿ ,  c, 
d r ￿ ,  x ￿ ,  B,  and  b  to  maximize  the  expected  negative  exponential  utility of 
the random variable: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S C D c d
W K B k b CY DY XZ cy dy xz K B k b − − = − + + − + + − − ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
The latter expression is the cash wealth of the bank at date 1 less the audit expenditures in both 
branches.  Recall  that  the  D ￿ -,  X ￿ -,  d ￿ -,  and  x ￿ -values  that  the  shareholder  optimizes  are 
substitute, that is, they are not applied as long as the managers retain their jobs. On the contrary, 
the  capital  values  C  and c, as well as the audit expenditures B and b, in the shareholder’s 
program are the ones to be actually implemented, as they are not co-determined by managers. 
The shareholder’s program can be equivalently solved for audit-per-unit-of-credit ex-
penditures A = B/ X ￿ , a = b/ x ￿  instead of B and b. We will employ the following convention for 
notational simplicity: 
Define  the  parameters 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
D









( ) ( )
( ) ( )
d








  –  interest-
rate elasticities of deposit supply by the public in the home and the foreign country. Further, let 
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( ) ( )
, , ( ) ( ), , , ( ) ( )
T D d




L N N G A AG A n n g a ag a
R r η η
′ ′ = − − − − − −
 




Its components are mean excess returns of assets from the shareholder’s perspective, adjusted 
for supply-elasticity effect in the case of deposits and for the marginal effect of auditing the ma-
nagers  in  the  case  of  loans.  Also,  let  Ω  be  the  covariance  matrix  of  the  random  vector 
[ ] , , , , ,
C D X S c d x s ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε − + − + . Finally, denote by  J ￿  the column vector of the share-
holder’s asset choices:  [ ] , , , , , .
T
J C D X c d x = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  Then the following necessary and sufficient 
first-order  conditions  of  optimality  can  be  easily  derived  from  standard  results  on  expected 




Ω ⋅ = ￿                                                                 (6a) 
( ) ( ) G A K XA ′ ′ = ￿                                                             (6b) 
( ) ( ) g a k xa ′ ′ = ￿                                                               (6c) 
In the absence of an audit, equation (6a) would be a standard portfolio-optimization result for 
a risk-averse investor with negative exponential utility of wealth. That is, a banker who operates 
both branches as an arm’s-length deposit-and-loan businesses, sets own capital, deposit, and 
loan volumes on the basis of excess return statistics of the six existing risky assets: their means 
and  the  covariance  structure.
7  In  Section  3  we  analyze  the  difference  that  the  twin  market 
imperfections of the banking business makes in terms of lending decisions. In particular, we are 
interested in the different reactions of the multinational bank to external shocks compared with 
the arm’s-length benchmark. 
3. External Shocks and Credit Creation 
As the results of Sections 2.2 and 2.3 indicate, the international bank reaction to exo-
genous disturbances in our model can be decomposed in two elements. First, manager-operated 
bank  branches  take  deposits  and  provide  credit  differently  than  do  shareholder-operated 
branches (equations [4a], [4b]). Second, the shareholder substitute decisions on deposits and 
loans are affected by shareholder-manager interactions (equation [6a]). 
As this paper is concerned with the transmission of shocks across national borders, we 
focus on the impact of the home-country asset parameters, such as N
D, σD, N
C, σC, and so forth, 
on the foreign-country bank-credit creation, x. Analyzing the consequence of the mean return 
parameters, N
C and N
D, turns out to be the most straightforward. Of these two, N
D, the average 
return on deposits, allows for quite a direct interpretation: its decrease corresponds to an in-
creased rate of deposit/withdrawal in the domestic economy (something like an adverse liquidity 
shock  experienced  by  home  depositors,  as  modeled  in  Diamond  and  Rajan  [2001]).  Inter-
pretation of the mean return N
C can be based on the capital-adequacy policy of the regulator. 
Indeed, tightening the capital-adequacy ratio can be mirror-imaged in our model as a reduction 
in the opportunity costs of capital. 
Certain properties of the bank’s balance-sheet reaction to shocks in N
C and N
D can be 
formulated in a uniformed fashion. Namely, let p be either N
C or N
D. The impact of a small 
change in p, in accordance with the results of Section 2, is naturally decomposed into the impact 
on substitute balance-sheet variables,  J ￿ , and the impact on the difference between the actual 
                                                            
7 Of course, the deposit volume is set indirectly through the deposit rate. However, in this paper neither 
depositor behavior nor depositor links with other strategic interactions in the economy is explicitly modeled. AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  99
and the substitute variables (D- D ￿ , X- X ￿ , d- d ￿ , x- x ￿ ). We start with the former, meaning that 
the shareholder-optimality conditions will have to be differentiated with respect to p. 
More notations will be needed to formulate the results. Thus: 
2
2 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
S
A G A K XA






￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, 
2
2 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
s
a g a k xa









where tildas indicate the optimal choice of the corresponding variables by the shareholder, as 
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to separate the usual portfolio-optimizing source of response to parameter change (i.e., L
0) from 
the bank-specific audit-optimizing source, L
S. (Note that the arm’s-length banker’s choice of 
portfolio is 
1 0 1
( ) J L ρ
γ
− = Ω .) 
Next, to avoid unnecessary exploration of the second-order impact of p on the second 
component of L (and L














, we identify a small shift in p with a small shift of the second component of L
0 as such. 
Indeed, although the reaction channeled through deposit demand elasticity may be important in 
its  own  right,  this  reaction is qualitatively the same for manager-auditing banks and arm’s- 
-length investors.
8 Our goal here, however, is the examination of specific effects that appear in 
shareholder-manager frictions. 
In short, using subscripts to denote partial differentiation, we can say that the p-impact 
on the right-hand side of the shareholder-optimality conditions in equation (6), represented by 
                                                            
8 For instance, if the deposit supply is a linear function of the interest rate in the relevant equilibrium 
values domain (see more to this case in Parametric Example 2), that is, one can write T(D) = T0D, 
t(d) = t0d, then the elastic deposit-supply effect can be accommodated by replacing the variances 
2
D σ , 
2












+ . This would mean a change in 
the correlation structure of matrix Ω, although a change that is independent of the role of manager human 
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Lp,  is  a  sum  of  the  standard  portfolio-diversification  impact 
0
p L   and  the  specific  impact 
S
p L coming from the shareholder-manager friction. 







Keeping the variance structure σC, σD, σX, σc, σd, σx fixed, we will denote the covariance matrix 
for the same asset-return noise vector by Ω(ρ). Recall that this is the matrix that determines, in 
a direct analogy to equation (6a) but with L replaced by L
0, the asset demands of an arm’s-length 
international investor. Obviously, for such an investor the balance-sheet reaction to a p-shock is 
characterized by the equation system: 
0 1
( ) p p J L ρ
γ
Ω ⋅ =                                                            (7) 
Accordingly,  if  I(ρ)  is  the  inverse  of  Ω(ρ),  then  the  sensitivity  of  the  lending  volume  in 
the foreign country to a small change in N
D is proportional to the second element in the sixth 
row of I(ρ), whereas its sensitivity to a small change in N
C – to minus the first element in 























                                             (8) 
The  substitute  asset  demands  in  a  manager-monitoring  multinational  bank  react  dif-
ferently. Denote by  Ω ￿  the covariance matrix Ω(ρ), in which the third element on the main dia-
gonal is replaced by 
2 2 2 2
X X S S σ σ σ α = + + ￿ , and the sixth element on the main diagonal – by 
2 2 2 2



























, and so forth, by obvious analogy. The result, generalizing equations (7) and (8) 
for the manager-monitoring bank shareholder, can then be stated as the following proposition, 
proved in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition  1  If  p  is  either  the  home  country  outside  the  investment-return  mean,  N
C,  or 
the mean (net of deposit interest rate and withdrawal rate) return on domestic deposits, N
D, then 
the bank-shareholder substitute balance-sheet reaction to a p-shock is characterized by: 
0 1
p p J L
γ
Ω⋅ = ￿ ￿                                                            (9) 
In particular, the sensitivity of the substitute lending volume in the foreign country to a small 
change in N
C and N

































                                       (10) 
The above proposition states that the manager-monitoring shareholder reacts to external shocks 
as if she were an arm’s-length investor with a distorted covariance structure of asset returns. 
First,  the  variance  of  returns  on  loans  (both  at  home  and  abroad)  is  expanded  to  include 
the shareholder audit noises ε
S and ε
s. It is also increased, respectively, by the value of 
2
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reduce the magnitudes on the right-hand side of equation (10) compared to equation (8), even if 
one ignores the transition from ρ to  ρ ￿  in I(ρ). In short, the “covariance effects” play a weaker 
role  when  the  bank  conducts  substitute  asset  diversification  than  when  the  same  manager-
monitoring bank conducts actual asset diversification under an arm’s-length approach. 
 
Parametric Example 1: Linear-quadratic Audit Costs 
To get a parametric representation of the shareholder’s audit role in her substitute deci-
sion making, consider a pair of linear-quadratic audit-cost functions 
2
0 0 (1 )
( )
2





0 0 (1 )
( )
2




for a set of positive constants, K0, k0. µH, µf. We will also select a special form of the substitute 







, and similarly for G. Under these assumptions, 
the first-order  condition  of  equation  (6c)  is  equivalent  to 
2
0









+ + = ￿ ,  and 
similarly for equation (6b). It can then be shown that optimal a is a decreasing function of  x ~ , 
similarly  for  A.  In  particular,  the  range  of  possible  audit-expenditure  realizations  (a,  A)  is 
bounded.  From  the  same  first-order  conditions,  we  also  derive  that  for  V
A>K0µH,  v
a>k0µf, 
the optimal audit expenditures are always positive. 
More  importantly,  we  are  able  to  make  the  right-hand  side  of  equation  (6a)  more 
explicit. Indeed, one immediately checks that 
2
0 ( ) ( ) (1 ) f f g a ag a v k a xa µ µ ′ − = + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , and si-
milarly  for the home-country parameters. By substituting the latter expression into equation 
(6a), we can transform it into: 
1 a a J L
γ





















































a, which differs from Ω in equation (6a) by the elements  
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  instead  of  variances 
2 2
X S σ σ + , 
2 2
x s σ σ +   in 
the third and sixth position on the main diagonal. That is, the audit has changed the portfolio 
problem  as  perceived  by  the  shareholder.  It  has  increased  the  mean  returns  on  loans  from 
the arm’s-length  levels  V  and  v  to,  respectively, 
2
0 H V K A µ + ￿   and 
2
0 f v k a µ + ￿ .  It  has also 
reduced the noise-return variances 
2
S σ , 
2
s σ  dealt by the shareholder in the course of her sub-
stitute management of the loan portfolio, to the extent proportional to the cube of the audit- 
-expense per-credit unit. The latter effect cannot erase the variances completely since, as men-
tioned  before,  the  optimal  audit  expenses  are  bounded.  (By  the proper choice of parameter 
values one can make the maximum feasible audit expenditures just offset the excess variances 
2
S σ  and 
2
s σ .) 
Altogether,  in the context of the present example, the optimal reaction to parameter 
changes can be visualized a little easier than in the general case covered by Proposition 1. 
The actual lending decisions are made by the branch manager and differ from the sub-
stituting shareholder decisions. Therefore, the total effect of a parameter change shall include 
the reaction of the manager. The latter is discussed next. 






( ) ( )
h
q x






,  with  h = χ(x)  being 
the optimal  manager effort as a function of loan volume, as characterized by the optimality 
condition in equation (4c). Introduce the auxiliary variables 
2 2 2 ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ
d d m
t d d d t d
σ σ
γ



















. The relative impact of the same parameters N
C and N
D as in 
Proposition 1, on the actual and the substitute loan volumes is described in the following pro-
position. 
 
Proposition  2  If  p  is  either  the  home  country  outside  the  investment  return  mean,  N
C,  or 
the mean return on domestic deposits, N
D, then the reaction of the foreign-branch-manager-
determined loan volume,  ˆ x , and the substitute loan volume,  x ￿ , to a p-shock are linked by 
the equation: 
( ) [ ]
2









′ ′′ − = + + − ￿ ￿ ￿                            (11) 
In  equation  (11),  ˆ d   is  the  manager-determined  deposit  volume.  (See  the  Appendix  for 
the proof.) 
Equation (11) can help us distinguish two modes of the actual and the substitute loan- 
-volume  reaction  to  a  p-shock. Namely, function q in equation (11) is typically strictly de-
creasing. The exact result, proved in the Appendix, is as follows. 
 
Lemma 1 If the marginal manager-effort cost function φ’ is convex, that is,  0 φ′′′ ≥  everywhere, 
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Lemma 1 allows us to define the critical loan volume level x
* by q(x
*)=δ. For equilibrium values 
* ˆ x x < ,  ˆ ( ) 0 q x δ − < , and the substitute loan-volume marginal reaction to a disturbance,  p x ￿ , 
goes in the opposite direction from  ˆ
p x  (we consider the impact of the second term on the right- 
-hand side of equation [11] to be small). For 
* ˆ x x > , both reactions go in parallel to each other.  
 
Parametric Example 2: Linear Manager-effort Costs, Linear Deposit Demand 
Let us consider a simple version of the above model with manager-effort costs depen-
dent linearly on his effort:  ( ) h h φ τ = , with τ a positive constant. (Recall that the results ob-
tained so far did not require strict convexity of the cost function φ.) To simplify things further, 
assume that the deposit demand by the public in the foreign country can be approximated by 
a linear function, at least in the range of d- and r
d-values that contain the equilibrium. Therefore, 
we take t(d) = t0d. This assumption makes variables  ˆ
d σ  and δ constants. To complete the para-
meterization of this example, we fix the functional form of the foreign-manager average loan- 



















The first-order condition of equation (4c), characterizing the optimal manager effort, can be 
used to express the latter as a function of optimal loan volume  ˆ x : 
1
























Equation (11) of Proposition 2 reduces to: 
( )
0










− = + ￿ ￿                                           (12) 
Now, being a linear combination of  p x ￿  and  p d ￿  (the quantities characterized by equation (9) in 
Proposition 1), the right-hand side of equation (12) is generically different from zero. Therefore, 
the left-hand side must be non-zero as well. This imposes the restriction  ˆ ( ) q x δ ≠  on the equi-
librium loan volume. In fact, the range of possible equilibria therewith becomes split into the re-
gion of “small loan volumes,” 
* ˆ x x < , and “large loan volumes,” 
* ˆ x x > . The critical value x
*, 
for which q(x
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Obviously,  for  the  small-loan-volume  equilibrium  to  be  feasible,  it  is  necessary  to  impose 
a technical condition, 








= < . 
Small-loan volume equilibria correspond to the case when the coefficient  ˆ ( ) q x δ −  on 
the left-hand side of equation (12) is negative. In such an equilibrium, the reactions of the actual 
and the substitute credit creation have opposite signs. (We are thinking of the situation when 
the deposit change effect  p d ￿  has a small weight compared to δ, for instance, for the reason of 
small correlation coefficient ρdx or the deposit supply coefficient t0.) Therefore, when the re-
lationship-banking  sector  in  the  foreign  country  is  relatively  small,  external  shocks  make 
the multinational bank manager react in a direction opposite to that of an international portfolio 
maximizer.  The  reason  is  that,  with  small  loan  volumes,  the  manager’s  objective  function 
responds very sensitively to his shifts of effort. Put differently, due to the marginal effect of 
effort  (or  credit  volume)  on  the  mean  loan  returns  being  a  decreasing  function,  a  credit 
contraction makes the manager look better in the shareholder’s eyes. In the region where these 
marginal effects are high (because credit volumes are low), the said motive is stronger than 
the standard portfolio-optimization motive. Consequently, when conventional portfolio-diver-
sification wisdom suggests expanding the loan volume, benefits from a revised human-capital 
involvement  in the loan management point to the opposite, and vice versa. 
Observe that this result is valid only for shocks abroad, that is, the variables that do not 
directly enter the manager’s surplus definition. Otherwise, for example, when a domestic depo-
sit/withdrawal-rate shock occurs, conventional arm’s-length investment motives typically domi-
nate. 
The large-loan-volume equilibria (when  ˆ ( ) q x δ < ), produce a co-movement of the ex-
ternal shock reaction between the actual and the substitute credit volumes. That is, the bank 
branch  reacts  qualitatively  similar  to  what  an  arm’s-length  investor  would  do.  Moreover, 
according to equation (12), the magnitude of this reaction is increased relatively to the substitute 
loan-volume reaction (since the ratio 
ˆ ( ) q x
δ
δ −
 is greater than 1). As was shown in Proposition 1, 
the substitute loan volume, on the other had, produces a dampened reaction to external shocks 
compared to the arm’s-length benchmark. Therefore, the overall effect, when compared with 
the case of the conventional international investor, may be either stronger or weaker, depending 
on the parameters of the model. In any event, a manager-auditing foreign-bank branch with 
a large-loan-volume equilibrium would be difficult to empirically separate from an arm’s-length 
lender based solely on its reaction to other-country disturbances. 
4. Extensions: Regulation Heterogeneity, Exchange-Rate Risks 
As long as foreign branches of a multinational bank have limited size, the home-country 
regulator of such a bank faces a more or less standard set of tasks. Our attention here will be 
given to the host country of a multinational bank branch. The available regulatory instruments in 
this case are limited compared to the standard. The capital-adequacy requirements are inappli-
cable, and the deposit-insurance arrangements are subject to international pressures toward har-
monization. There remains some space for discretion with regard to solvency criteria and dis-
closure requirements. In terms of the model formulated in the previous sections, solvency cri-
teria can be very loosely associated with the deposit/withdrawal rate ξ. The disclosure rules can 
be naturally associated with a parameter in the manager audit cost function k. Indeed, the branch 
remains solvent as long as its end-of-period cash wealth is able to absorb the withdrawal of 
deposits. In its decisions, the bank takes into account the statistics of the withdrawal rate ξ. 
Therefore,  a  supervisory  tightening  of  the  solvency  criteria  (e.g.,  more  frequent  on-site  in-AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  105
spections, more strict enforcement of reporting obligations, etc.) can be represented by an in-
crease in the mean value of ξ, or equivalently, by a fall in the mean deposit return rate n
d. 
The audit-cost reduction is linked to disclosure standards in an even more obvious way: the more 
the public (and hence the shareholder) is entitled to know about the loan quality via mandatory 
information channels, the less will have to be extracted by an effort-consuming auditing pro-
cedure. 
Below, we give some formal observations on the host-country regulator possibilities 
offered by the two policy instruments mentioned above. 
4.1 Branch Solvency Requirements 
As  explained  before,  the  adjustment  of  these  requirements  by  the  regulator  can  be 
formally  accommodated  as  an  exogenous  shift  in  the  value  of  parameter  n
d.  Suppose  that 
the welfare criterion pursued by the policymaker is in a one-to-one correspondence with some 
function ω of the deposit and credit volumes d and x. In reaction to a shock of a given size to 
a foreign variable (i.e., one of those discussed in the previous section), the regulator is able to 
adjust the average rate of the deposit return n
d by a multiple θ of this shock size. Parameter θ 
can be both positive and negative, depending on the direction of the policy response. From the re-
sults of Sections 2 and 3 it follows that there should always be a value of θ that improves 
the welfare of the host country. 
To see this, let p, as above, be the foreign variable subject to shock.
9 According to our 
assumption, and in the notation of Section 3, the marginal change in welfare is equal to 
ˆ ˆ
d p x p d x ω ω +  
In other words, the host-country welfare will be improved if  









> −                                                         (13) 
To find out for which values of the policy-response parameter θ (equation (13)) are satisfied, 
one needs to go through the derivations that have led to the results of Propositions 1 and 2 and 
trace the impact of θ. Compared with Section 3, the following adjustments must be made in 
the calculations. First, equation (4b) shall be corrected to include the explicit dependence on p 
due to the policy response: 
( ) ( )
2 ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ
d
d x dx d m
n p d d t d
x x d d
θ
σ σ ρ σ
γ
′ + − −
− + − =
￿
￿ ￿  
This equation must be then a differentiated wrt p in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2 
in the Appendix. This will produce the θ-corrected relation between  ˆ ˆ ( , ) p p d x  and  ( , ) p p d x ￿ ￿ . 
Second, n
d must be replaced by n
d + θp in the definition of vector L
0 preceding equation (9) of 
Proposition 1. Accordingly, the fifth component of the partial derivative 
0
p L  of L
0 will be in-
creased by θ in the modified version of equation (9). This equation will generate the θ-corrected 
values of ( , ) p p d x ￿ ￿ . 
Combining the two described adjustments, it is possible to obtain the ratio on the left- 
-hand side of equation (13) as a function of θ. And, given the linear nature of the involved θ-de-
pendences in  ˆ ˆ ( , ) p p d x , it is always possible to find values of this policy parameter that improve 
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welfare. Consequently, there is always place for welfare-improving national-policy reactions in 
the solvency standard area, in the sense that national discretion dominates international har-
monization. 
4.2 Transparency and Audit Costs 
One possible way of representing the transparency-requirement effect on audit costs is to 
associate a policy parameter with the audit-noise variance 
2
s σ . Another is to assume that there 
is a policy parameter P that appears as a multiplicative factor by the audit-effort variable a in 
the cost function k. Since the workings of the latter alternative are easier to describe in terms of 
space and notation, we chose it. 
The presence of the multiplicative audit cost-reducing policy parameter P means that 
the cost function k has the form k(b) = kn(Pb), where kn is another strictly increasing and strictly 
convex function with kn(0) = 0. The welfare consequences of the P adjustment can be analyzed 
in the same way as in the solvency-requirements case above, that is, with the help of equation 
(13), with p replaced by P. Calculation of the P impact on deposit and loan volumes can proceed 
as before. Because audit costs do not enter the manager’s surplus definition, the P dependence 
of equations (4) is the same as stated in Section 3 and the proof of Proposition 2 in the Ap-
pendix. The difference comes up only in the response of substitute asset holdings, chosen by 
the shareholder. Namely, the last component of vector L
S has a special dependence on P. By 





Ω⋅ = ￿ ￿                                                             (14) 
with vector L
n defined as 
2 ( ) ( )
0,0,0,0,0,
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L x











. The remaining ariables 
are the same as in Section 3. 
Now observe that the last component of L
n is a negative quantity, so that the impact of 
P reduction (i.e., higher transparency requirements) on  x ￿  is always positive. The overall impact 
on the actual loan volume  ˆ x  is as stated in Proposition 2, that is, ambiguous. For instance, in 
the “small-loan-volume equilibrium” from Parametric Example 2 (Section 3), higher transpa-
rency reduces the audit costs and increases the substitute loan volume, but the actual credit may 
go down (unless the impact on the substitute deposit level reverts the overall outcome). This 
happens because a cheaper audit is exploited by the shareholder in the “income-effect” mode, so 
that the audit effort is not increased sufficiently. On the manager side, effort is an increasing 
function of current loan volume, whereas the marginal effect of managerial effort,  f ′, decreases 
in effort. Therefore, when the loan volume is small, the manager is trapped in the region of 
decision  variables  with  “perverse”  incentives:  under  any  exogenous  disturbance,  he  would 
prefer to be in a state with a reduced need for effort and a lower loan volume. 
On the contrary, in the “large-loan-volume equilibrium,” cheaper audit policies always 
result in credit expansion because the manager-set and the substitute credit volumes move in 
the same direction in response to shocks. 
4.3 Exchange-RateVolatility 
The formal setting with normal excess returns and negative exponential utility used in 
this paper is not particularly suitable for an explicit analysis of exchange-rate effects on inter-
national  investment.  The  problem  is  that  a  normally  distributed  excess-foreign-asset  return, 
accounted  in  foreign  currency,  after  being  multiplied  by  the  exchange-rate  variable,  should AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  107
remain normal to allow the certainty-equivalence procedure to go through. However, a ratio of 
two normal variables does not possess a convenient parametric distribution, let alone such that 
would be appropriate to associate with the exchange rate. Therefore, one does not have the ad-
vantage provided by the expected value maximization for a lognormally-distributed wealth, and 
calculations become complicated. Here, while ignoring this unpleasant complication, we offer 
only  a  few  general  comments,  based  on  understanding  the  foreign  asset  returns  as  random 
variables distorted by an exchange-rate risk with unspecified statistical properties. 
From the multinational-bank shareholder point of view, the presence of exchange-rate 
risk means that the statistics of returns on assets that are foreign to her, that is, c, d, and x, have 
a more specialized form compared with the one posited in Section 2. Namely, if S = S0(1 + s) is 
the uncertain nominal price of a foreign-currency unit in domestic-currency terms on date 1 (and 
S0  is  its  known  value  at  date  0),  then  the  foreign-asset  returns  have  the  form  1 + r
0=
  
= (1 + s)(1 + r
*0),  1 + r
c = (1 + s)(1 + r
*c),  1 + r
d = (1 + s)(1 + r
*d), 1 + r
x = (1 + s)(1 + r
*x), with 
asterisks denoting the foreign-currency-denominated returns. If the foreign-branch manager is 










x accounted in the currency of her country of incorporation. As a result, 
even if we ignore the non-normality of, at least, some random factors appearing in the agents’ 
optimization  problems  in this new setting, the covariance structures appearing in the share-
holder’s and the foreign-branch manager’s problems will be different. Due to the exchange-rate 
risk, one should typically expect a higher level of all the covariances involving foreign uncer-
tainties than those involving domestic uncertainties only in the shareholder’s problem. This will 
have an impact on the substitute asset-value choice by the shareholder. However, this effect, 
which is not at all relationship-banking specific, will combine with the usual manager decisions, 
as described in Section 2.3, making the overall picture more involved. 
For instance, one could try to assess the impact of an increased exchange-rate volatility 
on the foreign-country-manager decisions, the credit creation in particular. For the local-resident 
manager, the exchange-rate parameters do not enter the definition of his surplus. Therefore, 
the result of Proposition 2, namely an analogue of equation (11), shall be valid, with p replaced 
by the exchange-rate volatility parameter. This gives us, as usual, a characterization of the credit- 
-volume  ˆ x  response relative to the response of the substitute value  x ￿ . To analyze the latter, 
one must posit some parametric form of the covariance matrix Ω-dependence on exchange-rate 
volatility. Let this be done in some unspecified way, denote the said volatility measure by ζ and 
by Ωζ – the partial derivative of Ω with respect to this variable. Note that matrix Ωζ shall have 
zeros in the left-upper quarter. Then, by proceeding similarly to Proposition 1, including the de-
finitions of 
2
S α , 
2
s α , and Ω ￿ , one can arrive at the following formula, a counterpart to equation (9): 
J J ζ ζ Ω⋅ = −Ω ⋅ ￿ ￿ ￿  
This equation would be valid for an arm’s-length international investor as well, with  Ω ￿  re-
placed by the original Ω. That is, once again, one obtains a comparison of the reaction of the ma-
nager-dependent and the arm’s-length bank to a shock, with the presence of managers resulting 
in a downshift of the correlation structure in the bank’s stochastic investment-opportunity set. 
The subsequent interposition of this substitute shareholder behavior with the actual behavior of 
the manager is subject to the same “large- vs. small-loan-volume case” distinction as described 
above. 
5. Conclusion 
The paper introduced a model of a multinational bank dependent on the specific human 
capital of the branch management. The results utilize an understanding of commercial banking 
as a business whose raison-d’être is provided by the involvement of non-transferable manager AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  108
skills. The bank shareholders motivate the managers to employ their human capital by means of 
their own, manager-auditing effort. This twin agency-cost paradigm is applied to a risk-averse 
bank shareholder operating branches and employing managers in two countries. We have in-
vestigated the reaction of one country branch to a shock happening to asset returns in another 
country, and compared it to the reaction to the same shock of a bank acting as an arm’s-length 
investor. The key notion that we found our analysis upon is the hypothetical substitute decision 
making of a bank shareholder in case she decides to do without the manager skills and save on 
his fees. The substitute portfolio decisions are different from both the decisions of an arm’s- 
-length bank and the actual decisions of the audited manager. The latter bases the effort and 
the loan-deposit choices on the intention to stay marginally more attractive to the shareholder 
than her own substitute management of the branch.  
Quantitative differences in the shock response in an international portfolio-optimizing 
environment  with  and  without  the  agency  problems  have  been  found,  as  expected.  More 
importantly, we have found that there might also be qualitative differences. That is, if the coun-
try is foreign to the shock, the latter can have opposite impacts on the credit creation by a ma-
nager-skill-dependent and an arm’s-length bank. In the model, this happens only on condition of 
small loan volumes, and the factor responsible for this phenomenon is manager sensitivity to 
effort costs. 
We also comment upon the choices of a national regulator in the constructed environ-
ment. Although domestic credit growth is not the concern of the financial-services regulator, 
a sudden reversal of credit to the non-bank private sector by banks under foreign control is 
likely  to  threaten  the  financial  situation  of  many  bank-dependent  firms  and  households.  In 
a small economy with an overwhelming dominance of a few big foreign lenders, this can mean 
a secondary impact on financial stability. Therefore, it is in the interest of the regulator to sup-
port a banking-service market with a possibly stable credit supply. This is an additional chal-
lenge beside the well-known problem of the pro-cyclic nature of risk-based capital requirements 
with  respect  to  domestic  banks.  Moreover,  in  a  banking  sector  mostly  populated  by  either 
foreign-bank branches or their overcapitalized subsidiaries, the regulator lacks the possibility to 
act through capital-adequacy requirements. However, there appears to exist some space for extra 
welfare-improving solvency criteria and transparency-requirement policy measures on the na-
tional  level.  This  means  that  the  “level-playing-ground”  regulation in terms of transparency 
might encounter opposition in countries with a high degree of foreign-bank penetration. 
A frequently posed question is the influence of the exchange-rate noise on the foreign- 
-bank operation. The issue is not considered in full detail, but the model suggests that bank 
branches managing large loan volumes may react differently from branches that manage small 
loan volumes, to exchange-rate volatility as to any other external shock. Once again we find 
that, whereas the shareholder substitute decisions are similar to the ones of any other interna-
tional portfolio optimizer, although with a reduced role for the asset-return correlations, the ma-
nager’s choices are subject to a qualitative difference if the loan volume under his control is 
sufficiently small. AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  109
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Appendix: Proofs 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
To prove equation (9), one needs to differentiate equation (6a) with respect to p. The derivative 
of the left-hand side is equal to  p J Ω￿ . The right-hand side is 
0 S
p p L L + , and one needs to calcu-
late 
S
p L . Clearly, 
[ ] ( ) ( )
( ) p







￿ ￿ ￿  
and a similar equality is valid for the last component of 
S
p L . Now we need to calculate the opti-
mal audit reaction to a p-change. This is done in the following lemma for the foreign-branch 
audit; the home-branch result is obtained by change of notation. 
 
Lemma A1: For any model parameter p, the partial derivatives of the shareholder’s optimal 
audit-per-loan-unit expenditure  a ￿  and the optimal substitute loan volume  x ￿  with respect to p 
are linked by: 
( )












PROOF:  This  is  a  direct  consequence  of  equation  (6c)  and  the  implicit-function  theorem. 
The latter is applicable since the audit-cost function k is convex, function g is strictly concave, 
and, therefore, the expression  ( ) ( ) xk xa g a ′′ ′′ − ￿ ￿￿ ￿  is strictly positive.  
Recalling the definitions of 
2
S α , 
2
s α , and  Ω ￿ , we see that the result of p-differentiation of equa-
tion (6a) can be written as equation (9). 











and observe that, in the notations of Section 3,  ( ) l l ρ Ω = ⋅Ω ⋅ ￿ ￿ . So, by multiplying both sides of 
equation (9) by 
1 − Ω ￿ , we get: 
1 1 0 1
( ) p p J l l L ρ
γ
− − = ⋅Ι ⋅ ⋅ ￿ ￿ , from which equation (10) follows by 
inspection of the corresponding matrix elements. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
The starting step of the proof is the p-differentiation of equation (4). Having conducted it, we 
get, recalling the definition of 
2 ˆ
d σ  and rearranging, the pair of equations: 
2
ˆ ˆ ( )
ˆ ˆ ( )
p
x p p d x dx p d x dx p m
f h h
x x d d σ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ
γ
′
− + = + ￿ ￿  
( )
2 2 ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ
d x dx p p d p d p m
t d
x x d d σ σ ρ σ σ
γ
′
− + = +  
 
 
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To reduce the right-hand side of the first one to known quantities, we need to calculate the opti-
mal manager-effort reaction to a p-change. This is done in Lemma A2. 
 
Lemma A2: For any model parameter p, the partial derivatives of the manager’s optimal effort 
level  ˆ h  and the optimal loan volume  ˆ x  with respect to p are linked by: 
ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ









PROOF:  This  is  a  direct  consequence  of  equation  (4c)  and  the  implicit-function  theorem. 
The latter is applicable since the effort-cost function φ is convex, function f is strictly concave, 
and, therefore, the expression  ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) h xf h φ′′ ′′ −  is strictly positive. 
The result of equation (11) in Proposition 2 is now obtained by routine algebra, given the defi-
nition of q and equation (4c).  
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1 
By  definition  of  q  and  χ,  ( ) ( ( )) ( ). q x f x x χ χ ′ ′ =   Then  ( )
2
q f f χ χ ′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′ = + .  The  first 
derivative of χ was obtained in Lemma A2. Differentiating equation (4c) twice, we get the fol-












Substituting the latter expression in that for q’, we see that it has the same sign as: 
( ) ( )
2 2
2 f x f xf f xf f f χ φ φ χ ′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′′ ′ ′′ ′ − − − +      
Therefore, the condition  0 φ′′′ ≥  is sufficient for the whole of the latter expression to be strictly 
negative. 